EURO ASIA NEWS INTERNET NEWSPAPER

Summary

• Since mid-2024, a large part of the ship-to-ship (StS)
  activities (transferring oil cargoes from one ship to
  another offshore to circumvent sanctions) of the so-
  called Russian shadow fleet were relocated off the
  Gulf of Augusta, in Sicily;
• https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-italy-stateless/2025/03/b21bfc90-280225_greenpeace_shadowfleet_en.pdf

These activities pose a significant environmental risk: 36% of the oil and derivatives traded from ship to ship in the waters off the Gulf of Augusta
were handled by old vessels that did not possess adequate insurance cover for spill damage; In addition to the ecological risk, the presence of
the shadow fleet off the coast of Augusta – where several submarine telecommunications cables terminate and one of the Italian Navy’s three arsenals is located – also poses a risk to maritime safety and national security. A ship, now seized by Finnish authorities on suspicion of sabotaging
submarine cables in the Baltic Sea, which reportedly also spied on the NATO fleet on behalf of Russia, had previously been sailing in circles in the Gulf of Augusta for a month.

• With some exceptions, access to EU ports is prohibited for ships that have changed from the Russian flag to that of another country after Februar 24, 2022. However, two ships already sanctionedfor this reason docked in an Italian port and apparently unloaded, while other two ships were allowed to dock even though they had just engaged in a StS-transfer with ships suspected of evading sanctions. In all four cases, the ships were appa-
  rently not subjected to the appropriate checks bythe Italian authorities, as required by European and international regulations.
• A number of Italian companies active in maritime transport act for the benefit of the Russian shadow fleet: RINA Spa continues to provide services to the ships of the shadow fleet, some of which were owned by Italian shipowners until recently. The provision of technical assistance services or the sale of vessels to entities linked to the Russian shadow fleet are both activities prohibited by European regulations;
  ITALIAN COMPLICITY AND ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF OIL EMBARGO VIOLATIONS
  The illicit activities of the Russian shadow fleet in Sicily Thomas Simon Mattia and Greenpeace Italy Investigation Unit March 2025
• Investigation14
• In the old port of Benghazi, the MV NOBEL carried out an StS transfer with the MV DELONIX (IMO 9298387) between December 2023 and March 2024, as a video identified by Greenpeace on the social network Tik-Tok shows (link to video, link to original post). DELONIX then sailed to Piraeus, Greece. Given DELONIX’s efforts to cover its tracks, Greenpeace was unable to confirm that the company dumped sanctioned products in Greece. One of DELONIX’s former managers,DYNAMICSHIPMANAGEMENT SA-LIB, is known to have sold a number of vessels to several anonymous shipowners, who then incorporated them into the Russian shadow fleet104. In April 2024, NOBEL conducted another StS with a vessel that has since been sanctioned by the EU as part of the Russian shadow fleet, the aforementioned MARABELLA SUN.
• The Shadow Fleet and Secret Oil Trade in the Mediterranean
• Among the vessels that became untraceable near Libya, the FLAMENCO (IMO 9411991) stands out. In October 2024, this ship sailed for 18 hours with its AIS system switched off before entering Benghazi. Shortly after, on November 4, it carried out a ship-to-ship (StS) transfer with the ROCK (IMO 9288356) — a vessel likely linked to the Russian shadow fleet — off the coast of Augusta, before returning to Libya.
• Another suspicious case involved the SEALEO (IMO 9473066). On August 24, 2024, it discharged crude oil of apparent Azerbaijani origin at the ISAB terminal in Augusta. However, prior to arrival, it had deactivated its AIS transmitter for 84 hours while sailing along the North African coast. According to EU regulations, such extended AIS deactivation constitutes suspicious activity. Yet, despite this, there is no evidence that Italian port authorities inspected the vessel — even though IMO guidelines recommend thorough inspections in cases where ships deliberately try to avoid detection.
• Similarly, the GHIBLI (IMO 9417799) switched off its AIS for 74 hours on August 28, 2024, while transiting near Libya. After being spotted in the Libyan port of As Sidrah, it headed to Augusta and unloaded crude oil at the Sonatrach terminal. Italian authorities did not inspect the vessel, and it was only checked a month later by Greek officials, who discovered it lacked an oil pollution liability certificate — one of the six red flags the IMO associates with shadow fleet operations. Notably, the company responsible for the ship’s safety management is the Italian firm Marwave Shipmanagement Srl.
• Greenpeace has not been able to reconstruct what happened during the periods when these vessels were “dark,” nor can it confirm any illegal activity. Still, the IMO considers deliberately disabling AIS/LRIT transmitters or concealing a ship’s true identity without valid security reasons as behaviors that may classify a vessel as part of the Russian shadow fleet.
• Other Uninspected Tankers in Italian Ports
• VALFOGLIA (IMO 9417309) — unloaded in Augusta on December 2, 2024, after being “dark” for 25 hours.
• KRITI LEGEND (IMO 9398266) — unloaded in Trieste on November 27, 2024, after being “dark” for 30 hours.
• Additional Tankers Involved in Suspicious Transfers
• Neither VALFOGLIA nor KRITI LEGEND was inspected by Italian authorities. Beyond these two ships, Greenpeace identified a series of other vessels engaged in ship-to-ship (StS) operations that show patterns consistent with IMO Resolution A.1192(33), which describes behaviors typical of the so-called shadow fleet.
• Selected Vessels
• LADY RINA (IMO 9631383)
  • Built: 2012 (12 years old)
  • Capacity: 39,310 tons
  • Flag: Italy (Tokyo MoU Grey List, Paris MoU White List)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: October 5, 2024, with MARITEA (IMO 9210919).
• HARDRADA (IMO 9344007)
  • Built: 2007 (17 years old)
  • Capacity: 45,983 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: September 30, 2024, with DUKE II (IMO 9254240).
• NOUNOU (IMO 9960980)
  • Built: 2023 (1 year old)
  • Capacity: 115,322 tons
  • Flag: Malta (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: September 30, 2024, with MARALTA (IMO 9324320); September 8, 2024, with ELECTRA (IMO 9307815); August 31, 2024, with CHIBA (IMO 9960980).
• SW CAP FERRAT I (IMO 9231614)
  • Built: 2002 (22 years old)
  • Capacity: 36,031 tons
  • Flag: Panama (Tokyo MoU White List, Paris MoU Grey List)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: September 30, 2024, with MOUNTING OLYMPUS (IMO 9260081).
• HELGA (IMO 9419151)
  • Built: 2010 (14 years old)
  • Capacity: 112,795 tons
  • Flag: Palau (Black Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Not adequately insured
  • Management: Gatik Ship Management, Caishan Ship Management, Unic Tanker Gemi Isletmeciligi
  • Activities: StS with sanctioned vessels, consistent with IMO Resolution A.1192(33)
  • StS: August 31, 2024, with E PIONEER (IMO 9278686).
• TG TAURUS (IMO 9523835)
  • Built: 2011 (13 years old)
  • Capacity: 26,199 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: August 21, 2024, with EAST AS OLIVIA (IMO 9340489); July 27, 2024, with MED ATLANTIC (IMO 9410533).
• MERONAS (IMO 9934905)
  • Built: 2022 (2 years old)
  • Capacity: 49,990 tons
  • Flag: Greece (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: August 16, 2024, with KIZOMBA (IMO 9433901).
• KIZOMBA (IMO 9433901)
  • Built: 2009 (15 years old)
  • Capacity: 51,747 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: August 14, 2024, with CONGA (IMO 9412000).
• CHRISTAL SKY (IMO 9334569)
  • Built: 2008 (16 years old)
  • Capacity: 73,956 tons
  • Flag: Marshall Islands (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: August 11, 2024, with ZEFIREA (IMO 9607643).
• HORAI (IMO 9290517)
  • Built: 2005 (19 years old)
  • Capacity: 40,000 tons
  • Flag: Gabon (Tokyo MoU Black List, Paris MoU White List)
  • Insurance: Not adequately insured
  • Management: Gatik Ship Management and Caishan Ship Management (change of management coincided with sanctions)
  • Activities: Consistent with IMO Resolution A.1192(33)
  • StS: July 27, 2024, with EPIK (IMO 9273832).
• Additional Vessels Engaged in Ship-to-Ship (StS) Operations
• MINERVA TYCHI (IMO 9410973)
  • Built: 2011 (13 years old)
  • Capacity: 156,516 tons
  • Flag: Marshall Islands (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: July 12, 2024, with MINERVA TYCHI.
• SEAWAYS DIAMOND HEAD (IMO 9727039)
  • Built: 2016 (8 years old)
  • Capacity: 299,989 tons
  • Flag: Marshall Islands (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: April 13, 2024, with MINERVA SYMPHONY (IMO 9304605).
• EVA HONG KONG (IMO 9800001)
  • Built: 2017 (7 years old)
  • Capacity: 19,861 tons
  • Flag: Philippines (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: April 3, 2024, with SPRING (IMO 9416812).
• EAGLE VICTORIA (IMO 9739513)
  • Built: 2016 (8 years old)
  • Capacity: 299,392 tons
  • Flag: Singapore (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: March 14, 2024, with NISSOS SIKINOS (IMO 9884033).
• JOYCE (IMO 9338814)
  • Built: 2007 (17 years old)
  • Capacity: 47,344 tons
  • Flag: Marshall Islands (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: February 13, 2024, with AMPHITRION (IMO 9724623).
• MINERVA PISCES (IMO 9410179)
  • Built: 2008 (16 years old)
  • Capacity: 105,475 tons
  • Flag: Malta (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: February 13, 2024, with EAGLE S (IMO 9329760).
• DING HENG 45 (IMO 9330795)
  • Built: 2007 (17 years old)
  • Capacity: 19,951 tons
  • Flag: Hong Kong, China (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: February 8, 2024, with EVA GOLD (IMO 9888132).
• SEAFRIEND (IMO 9629574)
  • Built: 2013 (11 years old)
  • Capacity: 50,660 tons
  • Flag: Malta (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: November 19, 2024, with YELLOW TRADER (IMO 9292840); May 11, 2024, with SAN SEBASTIAN (IMO 9314856).
• BELLARIS (IMO 9332614)
  • Built: 2008 (16 years old)
  • Capacity: 74,996 tons
  • Flag: Panama (Tokyo MoU White List, Paris MoU Grey List)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • Management: Macario Shipping and Fractal Marine (both under UK sanctions)
  • StS: November 4, 2024, with INDUS 1 (IMO 9360415).
• FLAMENCO (IMO 9411991)
  • Built: 2009 (15 years old)
  • Capacity: 37,873 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: November 4, 2024, with ROCK (IMO 9288356).
• FOTUO (IMO 9293959)
  • Built: 2006 (18 years old)
  • Capacity: 40,158 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Not adequately insured
  • StS: November 4, 2024, with MARTA 1 (IMO 9323974).
• IBLEA (IMO 9244441)
  • Built: 2003 (21 years old)
  • Capacity: 35,676 tons
  • Flag: Italy (Tokyo MoU Grey List, Paris MoU White List)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: November 2, 2024, with ROCK (IMO 9288356).
• MYTHOS (IMO 9314894)
  • Built: 2006 (18 years old)
  • Capacity: 39,378 tons
  • Flag: Gabon (Tokyo MoU Black List, Paris MoU White List)
  • Insurance: Not adequately insured
  • Source: Kyiv School of Economics reports it as part of the shadow fleet
  • StS: October 25, 2024, with MARTA 1 (IMO 9323974).
• Additional Vessels Engaged in Ship-to-Ship (StS) Operations
• CLEAN JUSTICE (IMO 9473717)
  • Built: 2011 (13 years old)
  • Capacity: 45,998 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • Management: Sovcomflot
  • StS: August 11, 2024, with KIZOMBA (IMO 9433901).
• ZEFIREA (IMO 9607643)
  • Built: 2012 (12 years old)
  • Capacity: 40,023 tons
  • Flag: Italy (Tokyo MoU Grey List, Paris MoU White List)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: August 11, 2024, with CHRISTAL SKY (IMO 9334569).
• EPIK (IMO 9273832)
  • Built: 2004 (20 years old)
  • Capacity: 46,719 tons
  • Flag: Panama (Tokyo MoU White List, Paris MoU Grey List)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: July 27, 2024, with HORAI (IMO 9290517).
• MED ATLANTIC (IMO 9410533)
  • Built: 2011 (13 years old)
  • Capacity: 26,234 tons
  • Flag: Malta (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: July 27, 2024, with TG TAURUS (IMO 9523835).
• MINERVA TYCHI (IMO 9723291)
  • Built: 2016 (8 years old)
  • Capacity: 39,070 tons
  • Flag: Greece (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: July 12, 2024, with ADVANTAGE OF SUGAR (IMO 9410973).
• JI XIANG (IMO 9384459)
  • Built: 2010 (14 years old)
  • Capacity: 30,720 tons
  • Flag: Panama (Tokyo MoU White List, Paris MoU Grey List)
  • Insurance: Not adequately insured
  • Management: Sun Ship Management (linked with Sovcomflot, EU-sanctioned)
  • StS: May 28, 2024, with MARTA 1 (IMO 9323974).
• DHT OSPREY (IMO 9734111)
  • Built: 2016 (8 years old)
  • Capacity: 299,999 tons
  • Flag: Hong Kong, China (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: April 18, 2024, with NISSOS SIKINOS (IMO 9884033).
• MINERVA SYMPHONY (IMO 9304605)
  • Built: 2006 (18 years old)
  • Capacity: 159,450 tons
  • Flag: Greece (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: April 13, 2024, with SEAWAYS DIAMOND HEAD (IMO 9727039).
• SPRING (IMO 9416812)
  • Built: 2009 (15 years old)
  • Capacity: 13,022 tons
  • Flag: Marshall Islands (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: April 3, 2024, with EVA HONG KONG (IMO 9800001).
• AMPHITRION (IMO 9724623)
  • Built: 2017 (7 years old)
  • Capacity: 50,102 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: February 13, 2024, with JOYCE (IMO 9338814).
• EAGLE S (IMO 9329760)
  • Built: 2006 (18 years old)
  • Capacity: 74,035 tons
  • Flag: Cook Islands (Tokyo MoU Black List, Paris MoU Grey List)
  • Insurance: Not adequately insured
  • Notes: Identified by Lloyd’s List as part of the shadow fleet; detained in Finland (December 2024) on suspicion of sabotaging underwater infrastructure.
  • StS: February 13, 2024, with MINERVA PISCES (IMO 9410179).
• EVA GOLD (IMO 9888132)
  • Built: 2022 (2 years old)
  • Capacity: 19,894 tons
  • Flag: Panama (Tokyo MoU White List, Paris MoU Grey List)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: February 8, 2024, with DING HENG 45 (IMO 9330795).
• MINERVA ANNA (IMO 9298507)
  • Built: 2005 (19 years old)
  • Capacity: 50,922 tons
  • Flag: Liberia (White Lists in both MoUs)
  • Insurance: Insured
  • StS: January 14, 2024, with YELLOW TRADER (IMO 9292840).
• List of sources
• 1 Greenpeace (September 2024), Analysis of Russian shadow fleet data. Risk of oil disaster off the German coast . https://www.green-
• peace.de/publikationen/analysis-of-russian-shadow-fleet-data
• 2 European Parliament (November 2024), Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: Bringing the threat to light
• https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/766242/EPRS_BRI(2024)766242_EN.pdf
• 3 European Commission, National competent authorities for the implementation of EU restrictive measures (sanctions), https://finance.
• ec.europa.eu/document/download/803d74d5-84a0-4bf4-a735-30f1fe5ae6dd_en?[…]onal-competent-authorities-sanctions-implemen-
• tation_en.pdf
• 4 The Maritime Executive (23. Juni, 2024) Russia’s Shadow Fleet Tactics Exposed. https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/russia-s-
• shadow-fleet-tactics-exposed
• 5 Council of the European Union. EU sanctions against Russia explained. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-
• russia-explained/
• 6 Council Regulation 833/2014 Frequently asked questions. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/faqs-sanctions-russia-eu-
• ports_en.pdf
• 7 International Maritime Organization, General Assembly resolution A.1192(33) https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCen-
• tre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyDocuments/A.1192(33).pdf
• 8 European Council, Explanation of EU sanctions against Russia.
• https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#oilban
• 9 Dire (April 2022)Italy closes ports to Russian ships: ban on docking.
• https://www.dire.it/16-04-2022/725121-da-domani-vietato-laccesso-alle-navi-russe-ai-porti-italiani/
• 10 European Commission (Feb. 24, 2025), EU adopts 16th sanctions package against Russia.
• https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_25_585
• 11 Maritime Mutual Insurance Association (NZ) Limited (June 30, 2023) Maritime Mutual Risk Bulletin No. 71.
• https://maritime-mutual.com/risk-bulletins/tanker-and-dry-cargo-sts-operations-high-levels-of-risk-demand-high-levels-of-awaren
• ess-and-precautions/
• 12 Geollect Intel (June 6, 2023) The Gulf of Laconia and Russian oil: A new hotspot for ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of Russian oil emer-
• ges. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/9e7530f88e5b4a3f81d94e23858c4044
• 13 Maritime traffic (May 22, 2024) Greece keeps a firm grip on the Gulf of Laconia: Naval exclusion zone disrupts Russian oil shipments.
• https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/maritime-news/34/risk-and%20compliance/2024/11229/greece-tightens-grip-on-laconian-gulf- na-
• val-exclusion-zone-d
• 14 Maritime traffic (August 6, 2024) Ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil: relocation from Greece to new hotspots. https://www.marine-
• traffic.com/en/maritime-news/34/risk-and%20compliance/2024/11393/ship-to-ship-transfers-of-russian-oil-shi fting-from-greece-t
• 15 Radio Vera (May 9, 2024) Η NAVTEX ΗΗΗ ΠΗΗΗμΗΗΗΗ ΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗ «ΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗ» ΗΗ ΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗ ΗΗΗπΗ ΗπΗ ΗΗ ΗΗΗΗΗΗ πΗΗΗΗΗΗΗΗ. https://www.radiovera.
• gr/2024/05/09/i-navtex-tou-polemikou-naftikou-katharise-to-lakoniko-kolpo-apo-to-rosiko-petrelaio/
• 16 Riviera Maritime Media (August 26, 2024) Renewal of the tanker fleet a challenge in view of ageing ships and scarce shipyard capaci-
• ties. https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/news-content-hub/tanker-fleet-renewal-challenging-amid-aging-vessels-and-
• tight- shipyard-capacity-82056
• 17 Follow The Money (October 23, 2024) Russian “shadow fleet” of dilapidated oil tankers threatens Europe with an environmental
• catastrophe. https://www.ftm.eu/articles/-shadow-fleet-of-rusty-russian-oil-tankers-are-an-environmental-disaster-waiting-to-hap-
• pen?share=fyPiwDHRdGSXTElk5iMPSBleuBpyYrbNrMwAKJdsee2jNfuooFVcCrP%2BtnvR%2B6M%3D
• 18 Greenpeace (September 2024), Analysis of Russian shadow fleet data. Risk of oil disaster off the German coast . https://www.green-
• peace.de/publikationen/analysis-of-russian-shadow-fleet-data
• 19 Bloomberg Investigates (December 6, 2023) The Shadow Fleet Fueling Russia’s War. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Azm4yKKIlqE
• 20 Greenpeace (September 24, 2024) Analysis of Russian Shadow Fleet Data Reveals Risk Of Oil Disaster Off German Coast. https://www.
• greenpeace.de/publikationen/2409_Greenpeace_Investigation_Shadow_Fleet.pdf
• 21 Calculated as the sum of the total carrying capacity of the vessels involved
• 22 PGI&I database. https://www.igpandi.org/vessel-search/
• 23 Offshore energy (May 8, 2023) The devastating explosion of the tanker Pablo highlights the dangers of the growing shadow fleet.
• https://www.offshore-energy.biz/pablo-tanker-explosion-exposes-dangers-of-growing-shadow-fleet/
• 24 Maritime Executive (March 19, 2024) Report: Dark Fleet tanker had collision off Denmark. https://maritime-executive.com/article/re-
• port-dark-fleet-tanker-had-a-collision-off-denmark
• 25 Greenpeace (September 24, 2024) Analysis of Russian Shadow Fleet Data Reveals Risk Of Oil Disaster Off German Coast. https://www.
• greenpeace.de/publikationen/2409_Greenpeace_Investigation_Shadow_Fleet.pdfInvestigation21
• 26 Ostsee Zeitung (February 22, 2025) EU setzt Tanker vor Rügen auf Sanktionsliste: Wie geht es weiter mit der „Eventin“?. )https://www.
• ostsee-zeitung.de/lokales/vorpommern-ruegen/ruegen/eu-setzt-tanker-vor-ruegen-auf-sanktionsliste-wie-geht-es-weiter-mit-der-
• eventin-2TER45WL35CXHOAHN7P6MH44PE.html
• 27 Deutsche Welle (January 12, 2025) Russian ‘shadow fleet’ oil tanker towed to German port. https://www.dw.com/en/russian-shadow-
• fleet-oil-tanker-towed-to-german-port/a-71276417
• 28 European Parliament (Nov. 2024), Russia’s “shadow fleet”: Bringing the threat to light https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
• BRIE/2024/766242/EPRS_BRI(2024)766242_EN.pdf
• 29 Abuja MoU Inspection Database. https://abujamou.org/en/inspection-database/
• 30 Lloyd’s List (July 18, 2024) “High-risk” dark fleet tanker leaves ABS class as unscheduled condition survey looms. https://www.lloyds-
• list.com/LL1149947/High-risk-dark-fleet-tanker-leaves-ABS-class-as-unscheduled-survey-into-condition-loom s
• 31 Lloyd’s List (December 27, 2024) Russia-linked cable-cutting tanker seized by Finland ‘was loaded with spying equipment’. https://
• http://www.lloydslist.com/LL1151955/Russia-linked-cable-cutting-tanker-seized-by-Finland-was-loaded-with-spying-equipment
• 32 YLE News (December 26, 2024) Estlink cable disruption: Finnish Border Guard detains tanker linked to Russia’s ‘dark fleet’. https://yle.
• fi/a/74-20133516
• 33 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 34 PGI&I database. https://www.igpandi.org/vessel-search/
• 35 Ministero della Difesa – Marina Militare. Marinarsen Augusta – Generalità e Struttura. https://www.marina.difesa.it/noi-siamo-la-mari-
• na/organizzazione/comandi-basi-enti/arsenali/marinarsen_augusta/Pagine/generalita_struttura.aspx
• 36 TeleGeography. Submarine Cable Map https://www.submarinecablemap.com
• 37 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (August 5, 2020) Moldova-Flagged Ship Suspected of Carrying Beirut Blast Chemicals.
• https://www.business-humanrights.org/it/ultime-notizie/moldova-flagged-ship-suspected-of-carrying-beirut-blast-chemicals/
• 38 PGI&I database. https://www.igpandi.org/vessel-search/
• 39 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 40 Ibid.
• 41 Financial Times (May 4, 2023) The unknown Indian company shipping millions of barrels of Russian oil. https://www.ft.com/con-
• tent/6f81585c-321a-41fb-bcdb-579e93381671
• 42 COUNCIL REGULATION 833/2014 Article 3ea (1a). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-
• 20241029&qid=1735904907311
• 43 Senato della Repubblica (Dec. 2021), atto di Sindacato Ispettivo n° 3-02989. https://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipo-
• doc=Sindisp&leg=18&id=1328961
• 44 Consiglio dell’Unione Europea. EU sanctions against Russia explained. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-
• russia-explained/
• 45 Trade Winds (April 7, 2022) Sanctions force DNV to cut classification of around 90 Sovcomflot ships. https://www.tradewindsnews.
• com/tankers/sanctions-force-dnv-to-cut-classification-of-around-90-sovcomflot-ships/2-1-1197119
• 46 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 47 PGI&I database. https://www.igpandi.org/vessel-search/
• 48 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 49 Tankers may not carry a cargo of crude oil if they have previously carried a cargo of refined products without first cleaning the holds,
• and vice versa. For this reason, when there was sufficient evidence to presume that a ship was carrying one type of cargo or another
• (clean or dirty), Greenpeace extended this presumption to other ships with which it had carried StS, unless there was evidence of
• possible cleaning of the holds.
• 50 Related Provision: Article 3ea of Council Regulation 833/2014 – Frequently Asked Questions. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/
• files/2024-01/faqs-sanctions-russia-consolidated_en.pdf
• 51 Greenpeace analysis based on Marine Traffic data
• 52 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 53 Lloyd’s List Intelligence (August 24, 2024) Evolving geopolitical risk, sanctions, the ‘dark’ fleet, and deceptive shipping practices.
• https://www.mlasa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/dark-fleet-presentation-august-24-2024.pdf
• 54 Financial Times (Mai 4, 2023) ‘The unknown Indian company shipping millions of barrels of Russian oil’ https://www.ft.com/con-
• tent/6f81585c-321a-41fb-bcdb-579e93381671
• 55 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 56 Ibid.
• 57 Lloyd’s List Intelligence (August 24, 2024) Evolving geopolitical risk, sanctions, the ‘dark’ fleet, and deceptive shipping practices.
• https://www.mlasa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/dark-fleet-presentation-august-24-2024.pdf
• 58 Shipping Italy (March 4, 2021) Shipowner Raffaele Brullo released; house arrest lifted. . https://www.shippingitaly.it/2021/03/04/larma-
• tore-raffaele-brullo-torna-in-liberta-annullati-gli-arresti-domiciliari/Investigation22
• 59 Shipping Italy (March 14, 2023) Arrivata in Russia la nave ex Lisca Bianca M di Brullo entrata a far parte della flotta Gatik. https://www.
• shippingitaly.it/2023/03/14/arrivata-in-russia-la-nave-ex-lisca-bianca-m-entrata-a-far-parte-della-flotta-gatik/
• 60 Annex XVI with reference to Article 4x of Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP.
• https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014D0512-20241029&qid=1735907681195
• 61 Related Provision: Article 3ea of Council Regulation 833/2014 – Frequently Asked Questions https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/
• files/2024-01/faqs-sanctions-russia-consolidated_en.pdf
• 62 Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, Harbour Office – Catania, Coast Guard. Notice of 26 March 2024. https://www.guardiacostiera.
• gov.it/catania/Documents/AVVISO%20DI%20DISMISSIONE%20FILICUDI%20M_Firmato.pdf
• 63 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 64 Panadata. Officers and directors database. https://www.panadata.net/personas/5509751
• 65 Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie du Togo. https://www.cfetogo.tg/annonces-legales/details-annonce-14162.html
• 66 Africa Intelligence (September 2, 2024). The secrets of Demex, the trader selling Russian oil in West Africa. https://www.africaintelli-
• gence.com/west-africa/2024/09/02/the-secrets-of-demex-the-trader-selling-russian-oil-in-west-africa,110281522-ge0
• 67 Ibid
• 68 Public Eye (November 21, 2023). Russian oil trade: Dubai pulls out all the stops to outdo Switzerland. https://www.publiceye.ch/en/to-
• pics/commodities-trading/russian-oil-trade-dubai-pulls-out-all-the-stops-to-edge-out-switzerland
• 69 Crewservices’ post on VK. https://vk.com/wall-79280167_33243
• 70 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 71 R(UE) 833/2014 Article 3q. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20241029&qid=1735904907311
• 72 Ibid
• 73 European Commission (Juni 2022). Consolidated FAQs on the implementation of Council Regulation No 833/2014, Council Regulation
• No 269/2014, Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/263. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/dow-
• nload/66e8fd7d-8057-4b9b-96c2-5e54bf573cd1_en?filename=faqs-sanctions-russia-consolidated_en.pdf
• 74 The ship had loaded in the port of Kulevi, which only handles oil and derivatives. https://www.kulevioilterminal.com/services
• 75 Greenpeace analysis based on Marine Traffic data.
• 76 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 77 Ibid.
• 78 COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/576 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R0576
• 79 TradeWinds (May 30, 2023) Spain fines Elephant owner over ship-to-ship secrecy. https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/spain-fi-
• nes-elephant-owner-over-ship-to-ship-secrecy/2-1-1458140
• 80 Ibid.
• 81 G. Tarabochia & C. Characteristics of the SILONE terminal.
• https://tarabochia.com/operations/terminals/terminal-prodotti-petroliferi-aquilinia/
• 82 Greenpeace analysis of Marine Traffic data.
• 83 Open Sanctions database. https://www.opensanctions.org/
• 84 Based on photographic evidence identified by Greenpeace on the internet, anonymous witness statements and confidential docu-
• ments obtained by the report (Rai 3).
• 85 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 86 Paris MoU Inspections database. https://parismou.org/inspection-Database/inspection-search
• 87 RINA Leonardoinfo Database. https://www.leonardoinfo.com/home/shipSearch
• 88 World ‘O Meter. Oil Reserves by Country. https://www.worldometers.info/oil/oil-reserves-by-country/
• 89 Bloomberg (February 7, 2024) The Odyssey of the Queen Majeda.
• https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-libya-russia-oil-smuggling/
• 90 Ibid.
• 91 INA Media (December 15, 2022) The court ruled: oil smuggling by a group of people who violated the UN embargo, but only the trans-
• porters were brought to justice.
• https://ina.media/it/2022/12/15/gjykata-vendosi-nafta-kontrabande-nga-grup-personash-qe-shkelen-embargon-e-kombeve-te-bashkuara-
• por-perpara-drejtesise-jane-vetem-transportuesit/
• 92 Nigrizia (December 2024), “Libya: Russia’s rapid expansion with three military bases in the country”. https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/li-
• bia-espansione-basi-russia-haftar; Med-Or Italian Foundation (March 14, 2024) “Libya and the Russian strategy for Africa”. https://www.
• med-or.org/news/la-libia-e-la-strategia-russa-per-lafrica
• 93 Greenpeace analysis based on Marine Traffic data
• 94 It is managed by Sand Gemi Isletmeciligi AS, which according to Lloyd’s List inherits part of the fleet from Gatik Ship Management.
• 95 It is managed by Sand Gemi Isletmeciligi AS, which according to Lloyd’s List inherits part of the fleet from Gatik Ship Management.Investigation23
• 96 African Energy (October 23, 2024) Libya: Oil and gas infrastructure map and production data. https://www.africa-energy.com/map/li-
• bya-oil-and-gas-infrastructure-map-and-production-data
• 97 Bloomberg (February 7, 2024) The Odyssey of the Queen Majeda. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2024-libya-russia-oil-smug-
• gling/
• 98 Lloyd’s List (October 21, 2024) Libya’s lucrative fuel smuggling operations sustained by small tanker network. https://www.lloydslist.
• com/LL1151054/Libya%e2%80%99s-lucrative-fuel-smuggling-operations-sustained-by-small-tanker-network
• 99 Greenpeace analysis of Marine Traffic data
• 100 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 101 Council of the European Union. EU sanctions against Russia declared. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-
• russia-explained/
• 102 TradeWinds (May 30, 2023) Spain fines Elephant owner over ship-to-ship secrecy. https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/spain-fi-
• nes-elephant-owner-over-ship-to-ship-secrecy/2-1-1458140
• 103 El Faro de Ceuta (February 8, 2023) Capitanía advierte de sanciones a las empresas que medien con petróleo ruso. https://elfarode-
• ceuta.es/capitania-advierte-sanciones-empresas-medien-petroleo-ruso/
• 104 KSE Institute (August 2024) The Core of Russia’s Shadow Fleet: Identifying Targets for Future Tanker Designations. https://sanctions.
• kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/KSE_core_shadow_fleet.pdf
• 105 Qualitative assessment based on the official IMO guidelines.
• 106 Based on photographic evidence identified by Greenpeace on the internet, anonymous witness statements and confidential docu-
• ments obtained by the report (Rai 3).
• 107 European Commission, Chapter 3 paragraph 25. https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/66e8fd7d-8057-4b9b-96c2-
• 5e54bf573cd1_en?filename=faqs-sanctions-russia-consolidated_en.pdf
• 108 International Maritime Organisation, General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCen-
• tre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyDocuments/A.1192(33).pdf
• 109 On the basis of confidential documents obtained by the report (Rai 3).
• 110 International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCen-
• tre/IndexofIMOResolutions/AssemblyDocuments/A.1192(33).pdf
• 111 Equasis database. https://www.equasis.org/
• 112 European Commission, National competent authorities for the implementation of EU restrictive measures (sanctions), https://finance.
• ec.europa.eu/document/download/803d74d5-84a0-4bf4-a735-30f1fe5ae6dd_en?[…]onal-competent-authorities-sanctions-implemen-
• tation_en.pdf
• 113 Publications highlighting the “complicity” of port authorities and shipowners in shadow fleet operations include the Atlantic Council
• (Dec. 2024), The threats posed by the global shadow fleet-and how to stop it. t/#problem-states. In particular in the following pass-
• ages: “This lack of compliance with maritime standards makes such port states complicit in the shadow fleet’s operations, and these
• countries thus contribute to the harm caused by the shadow ships. […] The situation today is that the shadow fleet exists and conti-
• nues to grow, and that it is surrounded by an ecosystem of willing helpers ranging from flag states to port authorities and owners”.
• 114 Reuters (Oct. 2023), ‘Everything for the front’: Russia allots a third of 2024 spending to defence. https://www.reuters.com/world/euro-
• pe/everything-front-russia-allots-third-2024-spending-defence-2023-10-02/
• 115 CREA (Sept. 2024), Sanctions hypocrisy: G7+ imports EUR 1.8 bn of Turkish oil products made from Russian crude, https://energyand-
• cleanair.org/publication/sanctions-hypocrisy-g7-imports-eur-1-8-bn-of-turkish-oil-products-made-from-russian-crude/
• The publication of this report was made possible by
• the support of Umweltstiftung Greenpeace.
• Imprint: Greenpeace e.V., Hongkongstraße 10, 20457 Hamburg, T 040 30618-0 Responsible for content: Nils Jansen;
• Text / Editor: Thomas Simon Mattia; Graphics: Thomas Simon Mattia, Wiebke Denkena, Carla Brobst; Photo header:
• [M]: Greenpeace; Photo Fig. 3: Stefan Sauer/dpa/picture-alliance; Photo Fig. 7 top: Hans Rosenkranz; Photo Fig. 7
• bottom: https://www.instagram.com/benghazi.city/; Layout: Carla Brobst
• Greenpeace is an independent global network that campaigns and takes action to change people’s opinions and be-
• havior, protect and preserve the environment, and promote peace.