CMA CGM and Russian Operations

Several entities under Russian jurisdiction remain subsidiaries of powerful global maritime corporations. Therefore, it makes sense to examine how compatible their operations are with the existing sanctions regime and the safety of maritime shipping — including oil transportation.

Let’s begin with the Russian subsidiary of a global structure like CMA CGM, one of the world’s largest shipping corporations, owned by Marseille-based billionaire Rodolphe Saadé, who inherited it from his father, Jacques Saadé. Fifty years ago, Jacques moved his commercial activity from Lebanon to France.

Rodolphe Saadé is a Knight of the Legion of Honour and a member of the U.S. Commercial Council.

His corporation invests heavily in public relations, sponsoring major sporting events such as the Tour de France and the recent Olympic Games in Paris.

CMA CGM, along with Delmas Shipping (a global structure it acquired 20 years ago headquartered in Le Havre), is primarily engaged in container shipping. The corporation’s official trade routes, including those in the Black Sea and the Baltic, do not include Russian ports.


✅ Part 2: Churkveidze from Sumgait ,Azerbaijan ?

A curious coincidence recently emerged — it was discovered that Gogi Churkveidze, the manager of CMA CGM’s Georgian office, was simultaneously heading the Azerbaijani company Aegis Voyage Shipmanagement, based in Sumgait. This company had been involved as the ISM manager of the sanctioned tanker “Luna” (IMO 9258868), operating under the flag of Vietnam.

In January 2025, the “Luna” tanker exported 100,000 tons of Urals crude oil worth $38.7 million from the Russian port of Ust-Luga on the Baltic Sea, through a UAE-based intermediary company called Fuel and Oil Dynamics FZE, controlled by Russian interests.


✅ Part 3: Russian Subsidiary and SMAShips RUS

This raises the need to closely examine the activities of CMA CGM’s Russian subsidiary, as well as the St. Petersburg-based company LLC “SMA Ships RUS” (Tax ID 7840061499), headed by Roman Baranets. This is a crewing structure (i.e., responsible for seafarer recruitment), established in 2017 by SMA Ships Singapore PTE. LTD and LLC CMA CGM Rus.

Since its inception, it has held a Russian license for seafarer recruitment (License No. 20117781343). The company, located in the “Stels” business center, has operated without interference from Russian authorities and reported a net profit of 35.4 million rubles in 2024.


✅ Part 4: CMA CGM Russia in the Hands of Pochtarev

CMA CGM has been active in Russia since the early 2000s, notably through LLC “CMA CGM Rus” (Tax ID 7705563140), which claims to operate in the transport and logistics sector. Its founder is the French company CMA CGM Agencies Worldwide, and its director is Mikhail Pochtarev.

Pochtarev can be described as a classic “multi-director”, as he is listed as a director in at least five other companies, evidently serving various beneficiaries. One of the most notable is the Moscow-based LLC “Airbus Rus” (Tax ID 7706644169), the Russian branch of the Airbus corporation.

Pochtarev’s involvement with CMA CGM’s Russian structures dates back quite a while. In 2009, there were reports that then-director Vladimir Glikson would be replaced by Norwegian Jasper Pedersen, with Pochtarev managing the transition period. However, Pedersen soon left the company and became part of Ukrainian logistics management, while Pochtarev remained — proving the phrase “nothing is more permanent than the temporary.”

Part 5: Global Shipping Network in the Hands of Shabotin

A far more intriguing figure is Oleg Shabotin — a former long-time co-founder of SMA Ships RUS, who mysteriously disappeared from its list of affiliates in 2024.

Shabotin has long headed the Russian subsidiaries of another global shipping giant — Marlow Navigation. The official history of Marlow Navigation dates back to 1982, founded by Dutchman Herman Eden. From the very beginning, the company operated through offices registered in the NetherlandsCyprus, and Germany.

As early as 2003, Shabotin was already the primary spokesperson for Marlow Navigation’s Russian office, and he currently leads:

  • JSC Marlow Navigation Russia
  • LLC Marlow Navigation Kaliningrad
  • LLC Marlow Navigation RUS (Rostov-on-Don), where he serves as general director.

Despite the “Rostov” name, Marlow Navigation’s Russian offices operate physically in St. Petersburg and Vladivostok, while in Novorossiysk, the affiliated company is LLC Sunrise Marine (est. 2015, Tax ID 9204004521). It was first founded by Boris Ezri, later replaced by Andrey Bugrimov.

Interestingly, Sunrise Marine was initially called Marlow Navigation Taurica, and its first office in Novorossiysk bore that name. References to the company exist on Marlow Navigation Rus’s official website. From the beginning, it was openly focused on recruiting Crimean seafarers, with reports from Sevastopol and Kerch noting local recruiters working under the Sunrise Marine brand, often out of unofficial “shadow” offices.

Bugrimov is originally from Kerch, while Boris Ezri, who has a Sevastopol tax ID, purchased an apartment there in 2015 and later entered into legal disputes with the sellers.


✅ Part 6: Under the German Flag… and Not Only

Data from open sources shows that Marlow Navigation Russia, like CMA CGM, recruits seafarers mainly for container ships and bulk carriers. However, among the job postings published in St. Petersburg in 2025, there were at least two tanker-related vacancies:

  • Chief Mate and Second Mate for tanker “Seamarlin” (IMO 9380489) under the German flag
  • Similar roles for tanker “Seaconger” (IMO 9352298)
  • Positions with German Tanker Shipping GmbH from Bremen

Strangely enough, both vessels were listed on the Magic Port maritime platform in August 2025 as sanctions-risk vessels, due to frequent calls at Novorossiysk to load oil destined for Mediterranean ports.

This raises a broader question: How “safe” is the position of Russian officers aboard container ships or bulk carriers of foreign (often unfriendly) nations, especially if those ships are carrying strategic or competitive cargo?

Officially, the recruitment of hundreds of Russian engineers and deck officers by Marlow Navigation Rus aligns with their stated cooperation with over 130 shipowners from Germany and the Netherlands — some of whom are undoubtedly major stakeholders.

But job listings targeted at Crimean recruits by Sunrise Marine (the Novorossiysk “daughter” of Marlow Navigation) show a higher proportion of tanker jobs, with lower advertised wages for those positions. In seafarer forums during 2023, users mentioned that “they’re sending us to the Indians at Nautica now.”

This likely refers to Nautica, a Georgian crewing agency specializing in tanker crews, with registration in the UAE and Indian shipowners among its clients.


✅ Part 7: “The Sauce” and Other Sanctioned Tankers

Among Nautica’s job listings in summer 2025 was a vacancy for a position aboard the tanker “The Sauce” (IMO 9315769) under the Liberian flag. That same year, the vessel transported Russian oil from both Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga.

Clearly, Sunrise Marine offers jobs starting on vessels loading cargo at Russian Black Sea ports, many of which are likely carrying sanctioned oil.

Notably, Sunrise Marine also offers seafarers “bank accounts in Kazakhstan” — likely a way to bypass sanctionsduring salary transfers. Such “special options” are most relevant to crew members serving aboard sanctioned vessels.

Part 12: The Tanker Network, Sanctioned Routes & Russian Crews

The analysis of job listings from all Baltic Group International Ltd offices confirms a clear pattern:

These companies are actively recruiting crew for tankers — often connected to sanctioned oil transport.

Here are a few concrete examples:


🚢 Case 1: Tanker “Free Spirit” / “Spirit 2” (IMO 9409259)
  • In late 2024, the Batumi office of Baltic Group International hired:
    • Alexander Shein, Russian citizen — as a marine engineer
    • Denis Kostyrsky, Russian citizen — as a third officer
  • In early 2025, the tanker changed its name to “Spirit 2”, re-flagged under:
    • Panama, then Palau
  • Despite this, on July 17, 2025, the UK government placed the vessel under sanctions for:”Transporting Russian oil to third countries.”
  • In August 2025, the same tanker was confirmed to be carrying Russian oil from Ust-Luga through the Suez Canal.

🚢 Case 2: 🇦🇿Tanker “Shusha” (IMO 9779941)
  • In October 2024, the Batumi office hired:
    • Elchin Mageramov, as third officer
  • In July 2025, this tanker (under the Azerbaijani flag) was:Sanctioned by the EU for transporting Russian oil to third countries.
  • The recruitment of Russian and post-Soviet crews for tankers transporting Russian oil is often masked through multiple front offices across:
    • Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia
    • Russia (in reduced visibility), and the UAE
  • The “relocation” of crewing operations to Batumi and Tbilisi enables operators to bypass Western sanctions, while still maintaining access to the post-Soviet labor market.
  • Even when vessels switch namesflags, or ownership, the same network of crewing firms continues supplying officers and engineers — creating a form of plausible deniability for parent companies, while still engaging in high-risk logistics.

  • A tanker like Shusha, whether acquired through a SOCAR subsidiary or operated by ASCO, ultimately belongs to and is controlled by the Azerbaijani state. This means:
    The tanker’s operations are part of Azerbaijan’s official energy and transport policy.
    If such tankers are involved in transporting Russian oil under sanctions, this is not a private initiative, but a matter that carries state-level responsibility and risk.
    The covert involvement of tankers like ShushaKarabakh, and Zangezur in the so-called shadow fleet cannot happen without the full knowledge of SOCAR leadership — up to the Minister of Economy himself.
    Such actions would not be possible without their awareness and consent.

🚢 Case 3: Tanker “Thunderbolt” / “Suria” / “Fondeya” (IMO 9388742)
  • In 2021, the Batumi office recruited:
    • Lasha Gograkadze, Georgian national, as crew member
  • The vessel underwent multiple name and flag changes:
    • From “Thunderbolt” → “Suria” → “Fondeya”
  • It was eventually sanctioned by:
    • UK, EU, Canada, and Australia for Russian oil transport
  • Critically, during this employment, the vessel was directly operated under “V. Ships UK”

🚢 Case 4: Tanker “Zumba” (IMO 9689160)
  • In 2024, the Novorossiysk office of Baltic Group International recruited:
    • Evgeny Korzhunov, Russian, as a marine electrician
  • The tanker sails under the Marshall Islands flag
  • As of August 2025, the vessel appeared on Magic Port as:“At risk of sanctions for likely transporting Russian oil.”

🚢 Case 5: Tanker “Prive Angel” (IMO 9397468)
  • Also in 2024, the same Novorossiysk office recruited:
    • Sergey Dobychin, Russian, as a foreman
  • The vessel sails under the Panamanian flag
  • Similarly flagged as high risk in August 2025 on Magic Port

🚢 Case 6: Tanker “BW Lara” / “Earth” (IMO 9269257)
  • The Kaliningrad office of the firm recruited:
    • Akaki Chikhladze, Georgian, as captain
  • The tanker, now renamed “Earth”, was in August 2025:Listed as sanctions-risk, after transporting Russian oil from Primorsk through the Suez Canal

🇬🇧 Headquartered in London 🇬🇧

V. Ships is part of V. Group Holdings Limited, which is registered in Monaco, headquartered in London, and has over 60 offices in 30 countries. A significant share of this company belongs to the American firm Advent International from Boston. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Russian company Baltic Group International’s web resources say nothing about the founders, the management team (except for a single mention of Feoktistov), or its general status under Russian jurisdiction.

At the same time, these resources acknowledge the presence of Baltic Group International’s branches in Riga, Batumi, Tbilisi, Astrakhan, Arkhangelsk, St. Petersburg, and Novorossiysk. Since 2025, the Novorossiysk office has been virtually “relocated” to Georgia, advising sailors to contact operators and managers there. The Riga address at 17a, Duntes iela, LV-100, coincides with the local office of the classification society Bureau Veritas, as well as the local branch of CMA CGM — “CMA CGM Latvia, SIA” — and other maritime entities.

In Georgia, this structure operates as Baltic Group International Georgia Ltd, registered in Batumi with VAT Number 211374047.

At the same time, Russian-language maritime portals report that Baltic Group International operates in Tallinn, Klaipeda, as well as in Samara, Nakhodka, and Kaliningrad.

Indeed, a firm of the same name, Baltic International Group OÜ (TIN 14016884), is registered in Tallinn (address: Harju maakond, Tallinn, Kesklinna linnaosa, Narva mnt 7-636, 10117), and in Klaipeda, Baltic Group International Klaipeda, UAB (TIN 142062212) is registered at Klaipėdos m. sav., Klaipėdos m., Jono g. 10.

An analysis of job vacancies from all Baltic Group International Ltd offices shows that they actively and widely recruit crew members specifically for tankers. For example, at the end of 2024, from the Batumi office of this corporation, Russian Alexander Shein was employed as a ship engineer on the tanker Free Spirit (IMO 9409259), and Russian Denis Kostyrsky was hired as the third officer.

Who is Elchin Magerramov?

At the beginning of 2025, this vessel, actively transporting Russian oil products, changed its name to Spirit 2 under the Panamanian flag and later Palau. However, this did not prevent the UK from including this ship on its sanctions list on July 17, 2025, specifically for transporting Russian oil to third countries. It should be added that in August 2025, the same tanker carried Russian oil from Ust-Luga towards the Suez Canal.

It was also revealed that in October 2024, the corporation’s Batumi office employed Elchin Magerramov as the third officer on the tanker Shusha (IMO 9779941). This tanker, sailing under the Azerbaijani flag, was sanctioned by the European Union in July 2025 precisely for transporting Russian oil to third countries.

Additionally, the same Batumi office employed Lasha Gogratadze in 2021 on the tanker Thunderbolt (IMO 9388742). Noteworthy here is not so much the tanker’s subsequent multiple changes of flags and names (from Thunderbolt to Suriaand then to Fondeya), or even its inclusion on sanctions lists by the UK, EU, Canada, and Australia for transporting Russian oil, but the fact that during this employment period, the tanker operated directly under the aegis of V. Ships UK.

Also, in 2024, the Baltic Group International Ltd office in Novorossiysk employed Evgeny Korzhunov as an electrical engineer on the tanker Zumba (IMO 9689160) under the Marshall Islands flag, and Sergey Dobychin as a boatswain on the tanker Prive Angel (IMO 9397468) under the Panamanian flag. In August 2025, these vessels were listed on the maritime portal MagicPort as being at sanction risk due to probable transportation of Russian oil.

Furthermore, the Kaliningrad office of this company employed Akaki Chikhladze as a boatswain on the tanker BW Lara(IMO 9269257), which today, under the name Earth, also appears in the sanction risk group because in August 2025, it transported Russian oil from Primorsk towards the Suez Canal…


✅ Final Observations

🌐 Closing Summary:

The activities of CMA CGMMarlow NavigationV.Ships, and associated crewing companies such as Baltic GroupSunrise Marine, and others — demonstrate how Russian maritime employmentsanctioned oil logistics, and global corporate structures intersect in a complex, carefully orchestrated system of shadow shipping.

This is not just an economic cooperation but also a geopolitical and strategic partnership. Russia and Azerbaijan have jointly established a shadow fleet to circumvent Western sanctions.

This network enables the rerouting of energy transportation and the implementation of new rules of international political and economic engagement.

The shadow fleet helps Russia mitigate the impact of sanctions on its energy revenues, while Azerbaijan strengthens its regional energy influence and geopolitical standing. Meanwhile, Western countries continue to monitor and respond to this network through sanctions and other measures.


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