Oman Emerges as a New Link in Russia’s Shadow Shipping Network

A maritime network operating out of Oman and the UAE uses a rotating series of shell companies, such as Dubai-based Dreamer Shipmanagement L.L.C-FZ, to enable Russian oil exports, according to reports [gcaptain.com]. This “shadow fleet” employs rapid re-flagging and AIS data manipulation, causing severe risks, including a 400-square-kilometer oil spill off the Omani coast.

The European Union has sanctioned Dubai-based Dreamer Shipmanagement L.L.C-FZ, adding another layer to an international maritime network accused of helping move Russian oil despite Western restrictions.

According to the EU, Dreamer managed three vessels involved in high-risk shipping practices, including the manipulation of maritime tracking systems, while transporting crude oil or petroleum products originating from or exported from Russia.

The designation highlights a broader pattern developing around Oman, which has maintained a neutral position toward Western sanctions on Moscow. Maritime records reviewed in recent months indicate that a growing number of vessels linked to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet have been reflagged to Oman or transferred to companies incorporated there.

One of those companies is Citrine Marine SPC, an Oman-registered oil and gas shipping business that was recently targeted by the EU. The bloc said the company controlled vessels involved in transporting Russian crude and petroleum products while using practices considered irregular or high risk. In its initial announcement, the EU incorrectly identified Citrine as being based in the United Arab Emirates.

Citrine, however, appears to be only one component of a much larger network.

Three Omani companies, one management structure

Corporate records point to close connections among three Oman-based shipping companies: Citrine Marine SPC, White Agate Marine SPC and Serpentine Marine SPC.

All three are linked to the same management group, comprising Omani national Nasr Nasser Ali Alomairi and Russian nationals Daniil Mosin and Igor Konfino.

Maritime data indicates that the three companies collectively own or control 29 vessels that have been sanctioned by the United States, European Union and/or United Kingdom.

The timing of the companies’ creation is also notable. All three were established in January 2025, shortly after 22 of the vessels associated with them had already been sanctioned.

Despite those connections, neither White Agate Marine nor Serpentine Marine had themselves been sanctioned at the time of the investigation, and their shared managers had also avoided direct sanctions.

Ownership structures lead back to Russia

The links become more significant when the companies’ ownership is examined.

Serpentine Marine is ultimately majority-owned by Sovcomflot PAO, Russia’s largest shipping company and a state-controlled enterprise that has been sanctioned by both the United States and United Kingdom.

White Agate Marine is owned by Cariba Carriers Ltd, a Seychelles-registered company for which little public information could be identified.

Citrine Marine, meanwhile, ultimately traces its ownership to Ladoga JSC, a Russian joint-stock company established in 2024.

Taken together, the ownership structures illustrate how Russian-linked interests can sit behind companies incorporated in other jurisdictions, while vessel operations are handled by yet another set of entities.

Dubai operators add another layer

The vessels’ operational arrangements lead from Oman to the UAE.

Citrine Marine’s fleet has been operated by Nova Shipmanagement L.L.C-FZ, which was also sanctioned by the EU.

A substantial portion of the fleets connected to White Agate Marine and Serpentine Marine has been operated by Dreamer Shipmanagement L.L.C-FZ, the Dubai company sanctioned by the EU in June.

Corporate records show that Dreamer and Nova are registered at the same Dubai address, the Meydan Hotel. Another company, Moonlight Shipmanagement L.L.C-FZ, has also been registered at the same location.

The address has previously appeared in media investigations examining networks allegedly involved in circumventing Russia-related sanctions.

A recurring cycle of operators

The history of the vessels suggests a recurring pattern.

Maritime records indicate that Moonlight previously operated 14 vessels that are now associated with Dreamer. After Moonlight was sanctioned by the EU in May 2025 for its alleged role in facilitating Russia’s shadow fleet, the vessels were subsequently moved under a different operator.

Similar changes appear to have occurred elsewhere in the network.

When an operator is sanctioned, vessels can be transferred to another company that has not yet been designated. The physical ships may remain the same, while their registered owners, operators or flags change.

That flexibility makes Russia’s shadow fleet difficult to disrupt through sanctions aimed at individual companies.

A fleet built around constant change

The Omani companies, Dubai-based managers and Russian-linked ownership structures point to a maritime system in which legal ownership, vessel management and commercial operations are spread across multiple jurisdictions.

For sanctions authorities, the challenge is therefore larger than identifying individual tankers. The network can be reorganized when one company comes under pressure, allowing vessels to continue operating through a different corporate vehicle.

Oman’s growing role in these structures is particularly significant. Its flag and corporate registration system appear alongside UAE-based ship managers and Russian-linked ownership in a network that continues to adapt to Western sanctions.

The result is a constantly shifting fleet in which the companies behind the ships can change faster than the underlying commercial relationships.